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Legal Profession 
by William J. Riegger* 
Professional Corporations Act 
The Professional Corporations Act, l which became effective 
November 13, 1968, seemingly caught most members of the 
California Bar unaware of its passage. Nevertheless, it will 
have an important effect upon attorneys and clients. The 
act enables the members of a number of professions, of which 
the legal profession is one, to form corporations and thereby 
obtain benefits that non-professional corporations now enjoy. 
Although it might seem appropriate for a review of the year's 
developments in the legal profession to give a painstaking 
analysis, a definitive work on this act has already been written. 
The article appears in the November-December Journal of the 
State Bar of California and is co-authored by three of the 
* B.S.L. 1949, J.D. 1950, University The author extends his appreciation 
of Minnesota. Professor of Law and to Roger A. Levy, student at Golden 
Assistant Dean, University of San Fran- Gate College, School of Law, for assist-
cisco School of Law. Member, Arizona ance in preparation of this article. 
and Minnesota State Bars. 1. Cal. Slats. 1968 Ch. 1375. 
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lawyers active in promulgating the act-Paul A. Peterson and 
Byron F. White of San Diego, and H. Bradley Jones of Los 
Angeles. 
Malpractice 
In Heyer v. Flaig,2 the supreme court clarified the appli-
cation of the statute of limitations, Code of Civil Procedure 
section 339 (1), to a complaint filed against an attorney for 
alleged malpractice. Plaintiffs brought the action for damages 
based on the attorney's negligence in preparing their deceased 
mother's will. The complaint was filed more than two years 
after preparation of the will but less than two years after the 
mother's death. 
Rather than interpret section 339 (1) under a contract 
theory, that the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries, and 
thus conclude that the period started to run when the will was 
made, the court invoked a tort theory under which the period 
would have have started at the time the mother died. The 
court applied the tort theory for two basic reasons. First, 
the attorney's duty to the testator extended to her death 
because of her reliance on the attorney preparing and main-
taining a testamentary scheme that would coincide with her 
wishes until her death. Second, plaintiffs were unable to 
bring an action against the defendant until the testator died, 
yet the period could not have commenced to run until a cause 
of action accrued; a cause of action cannot accrue until there 
is an available remedy. 
If the attorney's negligence is the failure to perfect an ap-
peal, may the injured client obtain damages from the attorney 
to the extent of the complaint even though unsuccessful in the 
trial court? According to Croce v. Sanchez,3 the client may 
not, if the appeal could not have led to a reversal as a matter 
of law. In Croce it was found that plaintiff, in the original 
suit, had not sustained her burden of proof. The appellate 
court reviewed the superior court file in both cases and the 
2. 70 Cal.2d -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 448 (1967), cert. den. 391 U.S. 927, 
449 P.2d 161 (1969). 20 L.Ed.2d 666, 88 S.Ct. 1827. 
3. 256 Cal. App.2d 680, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
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reporter's transcript in the first cause and found nothing 
requiring a reversal. In effect, does this not give a client 
who has lost the right to appeal an appellate review of the 
original action? 
In Propria Persona 
In City of Downey v. Johnson,4 the determinative issue on 
appeal became not the extent of an award for the city's con-
demnation of a deceased's property, but Johnson's capacity 
as executor and conservator to appear in propria persona. 
The court held that, although Johnson in his representative 
capacity could file a notice of appeal, he could not appear in 
propria persona at trial or on appeal. Because Johnson did 
so appear, the appellate court concluded that the judgment 
below, condemning the property and rendering an award, was 
void: "( A) person who is not a licensed attorney and who is 
acting as an administrator, executor or guardian cannot prac-
tice law in matters relating to his trusteeship on the theory 
that he is practicing for himself."5 
Fee Splitting 
During the past year the Court of Appeal, Second District 
was called upon to decide an interesting case, Provisor v. 
Haas Realty,6 dealing with an attorney's right to an agreed 
share of a real estate broker's commission. In rendering its 
decision the court set forth some guidelines, quite helpful to 
the practitioner in determining when he may judiciously enter 
into such an agreement and collect his fee under its terms. 
Plaintiff, an attorney, was asked by persons interested in 
certain real property to help them negotiate for its purchase. 
The sale was offered through the defendant, a real estate 
broker. With plaintiff's help in the negotiations, a sale was 
4. 263 Cal. App.2d 775, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 830 (1968). 
5. 263 Cal. App.2d at 779, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. at 833, quoted from Arkansas 
Bar Assn. v. Union Nat. Bank, 224 
Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); In re 
Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 
318, 73 A.L.R. 1319 (1930). 
6. 256 Cal. App.2d 850, 64 Cal. Rptr. 
509 (1967). 
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consummated. Defendant refused to pay plaintiff his agreed 
share of the commission. 
Plaintiff's claim rested upon two separate oral agreements, 
each confirmed by a memorandum signed by defendant's 
agent: the first in time entitled him to half the commission 
as a fee; the second entitled him to all the commission over 
$5,600. Payment was conditioned upon the making of the 
sale. Neither of the memorandums mentioned for whom 
plaintiff was working. 
At the trial there was contradictory testimony concerning 
a conference in which plaintiff, the defendant's agent, and 
plaintiff's clients had together conferred over who was obli-
gated to pay plaintiff's fees. Plaintiff testified that he told 
defendant's agent that he expected to be paid for services to 
be rendered and that he told his clients that he expected to 
be paid whether the sale was made or not. One of his clients 
testified that it was agreed at the conference that the clients 
would be liable only if the sale did not materialize; otherwise 
the defendant was to be liable. The agent testified that noth-
ing was said about paying plaintiff for legal services rendered 
or about to be rendered to his clients and nothing was said 
about their paying a fee if the sale was not consummated.7 
In arriving at a decision against the plaintiff attorney, 
the court construed two statutes. The first was California 
Business and Professions Code section 10137-"Splitting of a 
Broker's Commission." It says in part: 
It is unlawful for any licensed real estate broker to em-
ploy or compensate, directly or indirectly, any person 
for performing any of the acts within the scope of this 
chapter who is not a licensed real estate broker, or a 
real estate salesman licensed under the broker employing 
or compensating him. 
The other was a special exemption for attorneys provided 
in section 10133 of the same code: 
The definitions of a real estate broker and a real estate 
7. 256 Cal. App.2d at 854, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. at 511. 
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salesman as set forth in sections 10131 and 10132, do not 
include the following. . ( c) Services rendered by 
an attorney at law in performing his duties as such at-
torney at law. (Emphasis added.) 
Since the plaintiff had no real estate broker's or salesman's 
license, was he rendering services in his capacity as an at-
torney under section 10133 and therefore legally eligible to 
collect a part of the commission? If the facts compel a nega-
tive answer, the attorney's work is characterized as that of 
a broker, is subject to the requirement of a license, and goes 
uncompensated. 
To answer this question in Provisor the court relied in part 
on decisions of other states having statutes substantially similar 
to sections 10137 and 10133.8 The court observed that these 
decisions have narrowed the avenue by which an attorney 
who is not licensed as a broker can enter the realm of a real 
estate broker or salesman and have further held that this 
avenue is available only when a true attorney-client relation-
ship exists. 
If the client does not seek to bind himself but seeks rather 
to shift the obligation of payment to the broker or seller, he 
is not in the true sense a client of the attorney. In this situation 
the attorney loses the statutory license exemption of 10133 
because his work is tantamount to that of a broker, who is 
subject to the fee splitting limitations of section 10137. As 
a consequence, if an attorney has no license he may not share 
in the broker's commission. 
The relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was 
not the same as in the situation above. The court in Provisor 
disposed of the possibility that the plaintiff was actually the 
defendant's attorney, by upholding the trial court's findings 
that no agreement existed between plaintiff and defendant and 
that plaintiff did not render any direct legal services to defend-
ant. 
Provisor indicates that short of possessing a broker's or 
8. Tobin v. Courshon, 155 So.2d v. Boraks, 341 Mich. 149, 67 N.W.2d 
785, 99 A.L.R.2d 1147 (1963); Krause 202 (1954). 
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salesman's license, the only means by which plaintiff could 
have recovered a fee based on the commission would have 
been to enter into an attorney-client relationship with the de-
fendant. 
Court-Appointed Counsel 
Justice Mosk, writing for the supreme court in Smith v. 
Superior Court,9 declared that a California lawyer is a general 
practitioner, not subject to any subjective limitation by a 
trial court and that a criminal defendant has as much right 
to keep a court-appointed counsel as he has to keep a retained 
counsel. 
This case arrived in the supreme court only after traveling 
twice through the trial court and the court of appeal. On 
the first appeal, an attorney was appointed to defend Smith. 
The conviction was reversed and a new trial granted.lO 
During the second trial, friction developed between the ap-
pointed counsel and the trial judge. At first, the judge ad-
monished counsel and later in the proceedings asked the law-
yer if he had ever handled a case involving the death penalty. 
To this, counsel replied, "No." The judge then remarked that 
a question had come to his mind concerning counsel's com-
petence to handle such a serious charge. Eventually the 
judge decided that counsel was incapable of representing the 
defendant and dismissed him from the case. 
New counsel was appointed without consulting defendant-
in fact, over his objections. Throughout the trial defendant 
vented his objections to the court, repeatedly asked to be 
represented by the original appointee and refused to cooperate 
with the newly appointed counsel. Defendant was again con-
victed. He appealed on the ground he was denied his con-
stitutional right to counsel of his choice. 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 284,11 the statu-
9. 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 
440 P.2d 65 (1968). 
10. People v. Powell, 67 Cal.2d 32, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137 
(1967). 
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tory authority for removing counsel, requires an application 
to the court by either defendant or counsel. Since neither 
had applied in Smith, did the court have the inherent power 
to remove counsel? Justice Mosk said that this power ad-
mittedly exists if counsel is physically incapacitated. More 
difficult, as Justice Mosk pointed out, is the situation here. 
To an extent the answer was supplied by the question "whether 
the foregoing power extends to the removal of counsel on 
the ground of the trial judge's subjective opinion that counsel 
is 'incompetent' because of ignorance of the law to try the 
particular case before him.,,12 Exercising this nonstatutory 
authority, the trial judge cannot impose his subjective opinion 
to the point of compromising the independence of the bar or 
infringing the constitutional rights of a defendant to be repre-
sented by counsel. 
In addressing itself to the first aspect of the case-the 
California attorney as a general practitioner-the court lucid-
ly points out that admission to the bar establishes the fact 
that the state deems the attorney competent to undertake the 
practice of law before all our courts in all types of actions. 
While trial judges may use the contempt power to guide 
counsel where necessary, only the supreme court has juris-
diction to take direct action if that original appraisal of the 
attorney be wrong. 
The opinion states further that the removal of counsel on 
the ground of incompetency is more of a threat to the in-
dependence of the bar than is an arbitrary misuse of the con-
tempt power. As original counsel said in writing for 
defendant, "if the advocate must labor under the threat that, 
at any moment, if his argument or advocacy should incur 
the displeasure or lack of immediate comprehension by the 
trial judge, he may be summarily relieved as counsel on a 
subjective charge of incompetency by the very trial judge 
consent of both client and attorney, attorney, after notice from one to the 
filed with the clerk, or entered upon the other. . . ." 
minutes; 2. Upon the order of the court, 12. 68 Cal.2d at 559, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
upon the application of either client or at 9, 440 P.2d at 73. 
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he is attempting to convince, his advocacy must of necessity be 
most guarded and lose much of its force and effect.»l3 
The other aspect of this case, involving the attorney-client 
relationship where counsel has been appointed, seems to turn 
on the constitutionality of whether the court's invasion is 
subjective. Here the supreme court acknowledged that an 
indigent defendant must generally be satisfied with the counsel 
appointed for him but pointed out that here defendant was 
indeed satisfied with the original appointment of counsel and 
was merely attempting to enforce it. 
It was argued that since defendant did not pay for the ap-
pointed counsel, he should not be able to object to a change. 
In finding this argument unpalatable the court noted that the 
attorney-client relationship entails a high degree of trust cul-
minated by a series of consultations and planning-it is cer-
tainly not a passing relationship and its existence is independ-
ent of the source of compensation. 
Ethical Standards 
Of general interest to the profession, the ABA Special 
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards has published a 
Preliminary Draft of the proposed new Code of Professional 
Responsibility.14 The final draft is to be submitted for action 
to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at 
its meeting in August, 1969. The report shows that the 
present code, in the main, was adopted in 1903, that repeated 
studies were made by special committees in 1928,1933,1937, 
and 1954, and that although these committees made recom-
mendations for overall revision, no action was taken on their 
recommendations. The present committee recommends re-
vision in "important areas involving the conduct of lawyers 
that are either only partially covered in or totally omitted 
from the canons," and where "changed and changing condi-
tions in our legal system and urbanized society require new 
statements of professional principles." The committee notes 
13. See 68 Cal.2d at 561, 69 Cal. ten request to the Committee at 1155 
Rptr. at 10, 440 P.2d at 74. East 60th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60634. 
14. Copies may be obtained by writ-
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the impact of the United States Supreme Court decisions on 
group legal services/5 on admission to the Bar, and on disci-
pline of attorneys.16 
15. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415,9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.C!. 328 (1963), 
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 1, 12 L.Ed.2d 89, 84 
S.Ct. 1113, 11 A.L.R.3d 1196 (1964), 
and United Mine Workers v. Ill. State 
Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 19 L.Ed. 
2d 426, 88 S.C!. 353 (1967). 
* 
16. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 
353 U.S. 232, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 77 S.C!. 
752, 64 A.L.R.2d 288 (1957); Spevak 
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 17 L.Ed.2d 574, 
87 S.C!. 625 (1967). 
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